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Abstract  
This article presents findings from a study of performance management in 10 schools, five 
primary and five secondary. The aim was to gain a snapshot of how headteachers are 
interpreting and implementing the reforms to the performance and capability procedures for 
teachers introduced in September 2013. The findings suggest that the evaluation of teachers is 
conducted within a context of normalised visibility with evidence of competence collected 
via observations, learning walks, electronic data, organisational and architectural structures. 
However, this normalised visibility is contrasted with the normalised invisibility of the actual 
processes of judgement such as appraisal. Invisibility also frames the management of 
incompetence, with poorly performing teachers routinely offered ‘compromise agreements’ 
to avoid the official capability procedures. The article concludes by highlighting the limits of 
the panoptic metaphor in a consideration of teacher evaluation and discusses an alternative 
metaphor, that of glass, with which to view the performance management of teachers. 
 
Introduction 
While performance management is deeply embedded within private sector organisations, its 
transposition to schools is far more recent, becoming formalised (and statutory) in 2000 
(DfEE, 2000). The aim of performance management can be understood as bringing together 
the needs of the individual with the needs of the organisation, to embed personal 
development and improvement with organisational development and improvement via the 
tools of evaluation, appraisal and capability procedures. Here, rather than such activities 
being the stuff of personnel departments, performance management as part of the human 
resources paradigm becomes integrated into the fabric of management, a task performed by 
line managers rather than specialists (Purcell and Hutchinson, 2007; McConville, 2006). Of 
course, although the aims of performance management – organisational success – may be 
shared between the private and public sectors, what success consists of differs greatly. In the 
private sector, organisational success may be measured in terms of profit or market share. In 
schools, however, success is instead measured by pupil achievement and ranking in league 
tables in an increasingly performative environment: parental choice is more greatly informed 
by league tables and Ofsted reports; Ofsted have employed almost zero-notice inspections 
and changed ‘satisfactory’ to ‘requiring improvement’; two gradings of ‘requires 
improvement’ places a school into special measures; poorly performing schools are being 
pressured to become academies (BBC, 2013a). And the more performative the  education 
environment has become, the more stringent the measures of performance management have 
become, culminating in the 2013 reforms that freed headteachers to observe teaching as often 
as they liked and drastically reduced the length and complexity of the capability and 
dismissal process.  
 
Against this background, this research aimed to provide a snapshot of performance 
management in schools to investigate how headteachers had interpreted and implemented the 
reforms. What was apparent was that in a culture of almost zero-notice inspection, 
headteachers were keen to ensure the Ofsted-readiness of their schools at all times by making 
teachers continually visible. Far from the days of internal inspection of pre-identified lessons, 
teachers now worked within a context of normalised visibility where their performance was 
available to whoever was there to see it: headteachers would engage in frequent learning 
walks, entering classrooms unannounced through doorless wide doorways to chat to pupils, 
check books and question the teacher about what was happening that lesson; in open plan 
learning spaces teaching and learning was watched by senior leaders whose offices were 
adjacent, by peers in neighbouring spaces and by the casual visitor who happened to walk by; 
organisational structures were designed to make individual performance visible by having 
schools-within-schools that contained small departments where underperformance was highly 
apparent; pupils were asked to provide feedback on their learning (and implicitly their 
teachers’ performance) in interviews with the headteachers. For teachers in the performative 
school, therefore, work was a matter of normalised visibility. However, while the collection 
of evaluation evidence was highly visible, the management of poor performance was found to 
be less visible, clandestine and hidden. Here, away from sight and the official capability 
procedures, headteachers would hold ‘conversations’ about the incompetent teacher’s future, 
negotiating ‘compromise agreements’ to pre-empt lengthy and visible capability processes. In 
these cases, instead, invisibility was normalised. Therefore, this article presents performance 
management as a matter of visibility and invisibility and discusses the findings in terms of 
two metaphors: schools as panoptic and schools as glass organisations. 
 
Performance Management in Schools 
Statutory performance management of teachers in England was introduced in September 
2000. Described as the world’s biggest performance management system (Mahony and 
Hextall, 2001, p. 182), the policy sought to develop teachers to ‘ensure job satisfaction, high 
levels of expertise and progression’ (DfEE, 2000). As such, performance management would 
meet the needs of children and raise standards. Drawing on the performance management 
practices of the private sector (see for example Armstrong, 1994; Lebas, 1995), the policy 
placed teacher effectiveness at the heart of school effectiveness, attempting to tie together the 
needs of the school, the individual teacher and pupils. However, the success of the policy was 
mixed, with varied approaches and commitments arising from the confusion over the 
meanings and purposes of performance management (Brown, 2005). New regulations were 
introduced in 2007 (TDA, 2007) that required schools to explicitly demonstrate how 
performance management linked with strategies for school improvement, self-evaluation and 
development planning. The policy also identified the sources of evidence that would feed into 
the performance management cycle including a maximum of three hours of lesson 
observation per year, staff training and work scrutiny (Morton, 2011). A third round of 
legislation came into force in September 2013, the first performance management approach 
of the coalition government (The Education (School Teachers’ Appraisal) (England) 
Regulations 2012) together with a model policy (DfE, 2012a). While the actual content of the 
reforms is similar in terms of aims and content, there are a number of significant changes. 
Firstly, the teaching standards – revised by the current government in 2010 – are central to 
the evaluation of teacher performance and development; secondly, appraisal is tied far more 
explicitly to recommendation for pay progression; thirdly (and perhaps most controversially), 
the three hour limit on teaching observations was removed; fourth, the informal stage of 
capability proceedings was abolished; finally, in a bid to remove poorly performing teachers 
more quickly, the ‘monitoring and review’ period following a first warning was reduced in 
length from 20 weeks to between four and ten weeks. These reforms should be seen within 
the wider reforms to teaching which removed national regulation of competence with the 
abolition of the General Teaching Council for England (see Page, 2013) which was often 
seen as unwilling to bar the ‘bad apples’ from the profession by certain elements of the media 
(Daily Mail, 2011; Paton, 2011). As such, the managing of teacher performance was solely in 
the hands of headteachers, removing the spectre of teacher incompetence from public 
visibility.  
 
Yet while the issue of performance management is central to the work of teachers, there has 
been relatively little research on the subject with the majority of it set within a focus on 
performance related pay rather than the processes of performance management (e.g. Wragg et 
al., 2003; Storey, 2000; Tomlinson, 2000; Haynes et al, 2003). Fidler and Atton (1999) argue 
that poor teacher performance is the result of past mis-management and that the majority of 
cases result in improvement as long as headteachers are appropriately determined. As such, 
they present a structure for managing poor performance that begins with staff selection, cited 
as a common source of capability issues. However, Fidler and Atton’s optimism as to 
improvement is not shared by other, larger studies that suggest improvement only occurs in 
21.5% of cases dealt with outside of formal procedures and just 12.7% of cases managed 
through capability procedures (Earnshaw et al., 2002). Commissioned by the Department for 
Education and Employment, Earnshaw et al’s study found that only 0.67% of teachers were 
on capability procedures in 1999-2000 and that 65% of headteachers had never experienced 
managing capability issues; where they had been managed, 46% were managed outside of the 
official procedures and an additional 40% at the informal stage. Only 4.8% of cases ended 
with dismissal or as a result of the ill-health of the teacher concerned. The study also found 
that heads were reluctant to confront capability issues because of issues such as competing 
priorities, a lack of confidence and concern about union involvement. Against this 
background, Jones et al. (2006) foreground the impact poor teacher performance can have on 
children’s learning, emphasizing the moral imperative of headteachers and teachers 
themselves to improve their practice through the development of effective self-reflection. 
 
Elsewhere, the literature tends to be almost exclusively critical of the practices of 
performance management in schools and is discussed within a wider context of 
performativity, managerialism and marketisation (Gleeson and Husbands, 2003); in this 
paradigm, performance management is located within managerial rather than professional 
thinking (Down, Hogan and Chadbourne, 1999). Mather and Seifert (2011) represent many of 
the themes of this paradigm, situating performance management within New Public 
Management, modern-day Taylorism ‘designed to gain control over craft workers through the 
separation of task conception and its execution’ (ibid, p28). Such an approach, proceeding 
from a labour process theory framework (see Braverman, 1974), relies on gaining the consent 
of teachers through perpetuating the ‘propaganda’ that better teacher performance leads to 
better ‘service provision’ adding legitimacy ‘to the ‘weeding out’ of poor performers’, those 
‘challenging’ teachers that senior leaders are often unwilling to tackle (Yariv and Coleman, 
2005). From this perspective, rather than acting as a means of driving forward quality, it 
becomes a ‘millstone’ (Forrester, 2011), a means of surveillance and control that de-
professionalises the workforce. Here, the emphasis is on teaching as performing in a 
dramaturgical sense, a fabrication of practice in Ball’s (2003) terms that prioritises what can 
be seen: this can be expressed within the pre-occupation with league-tables (Wilson, Croxson 
and Atkinson, 2004; Perryman et al., 2011) or a rehearsal for an Ofsted inspection (Perryman, 
2009; Page, 2013). Here we find a concern with the panopticism of performance 
management, the Foucauldian (Foucault, 1991) metaphor of constant potential surveillance 
that aims to create docile bodies capable of self-discipline, an analysis that has been well-
rehearsed in education contexts (e.g. Bushnell 2003; Piro 2008; Selwyn 2000). The 
panopticon was originally a design for a prison by Jeremey Bentham in the late 18th century 
that arranged individualized prison cells in a circle around a central guard tower. Integral to 
the design was the fact that prisoners could not tell when the guard tower was staffed, the 
viewing slats constructed to facilitate the guards looking out but not the prisoners looking in. 
As such, aware that they could potentially be observed at any time, prisoners would become 
reflective and would internalize discipline, self-regulating their behaviours under fear of 
perpetual or potential gaze. Foucault (1991) developed the concept of the panoptic as a 
metaphor for control in contemporary society and organisations, an efficient means of 
producing docility as a response to perpetual potential gaze by those in authority. In 
educational contexts, the panoptic is perhaps best personified by Ofsted. Giving almost no 
notice of an impending inspection, headteachers have little choice but to ensure their schools 
become self-inspecting  (Ferguson et al., 2000; McBeath, 2006) and in a constant state of 
Ofsted-readiness, ensuring that teachers are performing at a good or better standard at all 
times. Such measures of performance management have been facilitated by the removal of 
the three hour a year teaching observation limit allowing headteachers to observe practice 
whenever they choose; this is perhaps the central point of conflict in the recent reforms of the 
performance management reforms, attracting strong opposition from the teaching unions 
(NASUWT, 2013) and individual schools (Baynes, 2013). Yet the panoptic in performance 
management is not only to be found within inspections and bservations – appraisal can also 
be considered within this perspective, especially as appraisals for teachers pre-date the 
formalisation of performance management (Whyte, 1986; Bartlett, 2000; Hanney, Seller and 
Telford, 2003). With shades of the confessional (Barry et al. 2001; Wilson 2002), appraisal 
can be seen panoptically in two ways: firstly, with an onus on teachers collecting evidence of 
their performance to inform their appraisal, participants engage in self-surveillance, 
becoming an informant to the process. Secondly, appraisal involves reflection, a practice 
analogous to Foucault’s (1986) conception of care of the self, the perpetual analysis of the 
our own behaviours against the prescribed  'regimen’ of practice,  creating an ‘existence 
dominated by self-preoccupation’ (Foucault, 1986, p238). As such, reflection is so embedded 
within education that its function as a means of self-surveillance (Bleakley, 1999; Clouder 
and Sellers, 2004) may be overlooked. Here, then, appraisal creates may produce the docile 
bodies required by the panoptic and the regimen of performativity, producing self-
preoccupied, self-disciplining teachers that are perpetually ready for Ofsted. Alternatively, it 
may produce resistance in terms of strike action when appraisal is deemed punitive (BBC, 
2013b).  
 
Yet there are also those studies that hint at the potential of performance management. In a 
study of secondary school leaders’ perceptions, Moreland (2009) found that performance 
management could be ‘a lifeline’ for teachers and managers when the schools were in 
‘challenging circumstances’ (p740): it could act to develop teachers’ self-esteem via praise 
and celebration of their abilities; it could also inform school self-evaluation, allowing senior 
leaders to increase the effectiveness of under-performing departments. Furthermore, 
performance management was also seen as vital to the strategic planning within the school by 
ensuring all staff were aware of the strategic vision. Similarly, Haynes et al. (2003) found that 
performance management had facilitated greater focus on teachers’ practice and a greater 
awareness of links between individual development and the development of the school. 
Elsewhere, the potential for teachers to take control of their own performance management, 
creating a sense of autonomy and control over their work is highlighted (Down, Chadbourne 
and Hogan, 2000) within more authentic performance management process (Gleeson and 
Husbands, 2003). 
 
The final element of the reforms to the performance management in schools concerns those 
teachers who are deemed not to have met the professional standards required (DfE, 2012b) 
who can now be dismissed within a term. Previously, in addition to internal disciplinary 
procedures, poorly performing teachers were subject to a professional disciplinary panel 
under the GTCE. Now, with issues of incompetence solely an internal matter, teachers have 
become distanced from comparable professions that retain an independent professional body 
and hold public hearings for accusations of incompetence; this is especially true of the 
medical professions where practitioners can be struck from the register for poor performance. 
Instead, teachers have shifted away from a paradigm of occupational professionalism with its 
associated ‘collegial authority’ with controls ‘operationalised by practitioners themselves 
who are guided by codes of professional ethics which are monitored by professional institutes 
and associations’ (Evetts, 2009, 23-4); instead, teachers become ensconced within a paradigm 
of organisational professionalism that regulates the externally derived regimen of what is 
good teaching and what ‘requires improvement’. Yet the reforms present an overly simplistic 
view of what constitutes incompetence and fails to highlight the difficulties of interpretation. 
Wragg et al.’s (1999) study of ‘failing teachers’ found a range of signifiers of incompetence 
taking in a number of forms that may not be incompetence at all: ‘failure to adhere to school 
policies’ and poor ‘relationships with teacher colleagues’ were cited by a number of 
headteachers as forms of incompetence, yet in other interpretations such measures may be 
more akin to teacher misbehaviour (Page, 2012) or even organisational resistance (Fleming 
and Sewell, 2002; Prasad and Prasad, 1998). However, while the reforms to dismissal have 
been described as a ‘bully’s charter’ (Harrison, 2012), a Sutton Trust report (Lewis and Pyle, 
2010) found that teachers supported the drive to sack under-performing colleagues more 
quickly: 52% of teachers and 73% of school leaders agreed or strongly agreed that schools 
were too constrained in dismissing poorly performing teachers; less than 21% of teachers 
disagreed. With such support from teachers themselves, the extent to which headteachers’ 
efforts at dismissing those incompetent teachers will be challenged is debatable. It may be 
that these findings represent the frustrations of ‘competent’ teachers having to compensate for 
their under-performing colleagues. From a more critical perspective, it may provide evidence 
of the colonisation of subjectivity (Knights and McCabe, 2000) that has gained consent ‘to 
the introduction and embedding of performance management regimes’ (Mather and Seifert, 
2011). From this perspective, the appraisal confessional and panoptic measures of 
surveillance may have truly created docile bodies in schools.  
 
Methodology 
The aim of this research was to gain a snapshot of the performance management practices 
within schools following the reforms that took effect in September 2013 and to explore how 
headteachers had interpreted and implemented the reforms. However, rather than just 
focusing on the design and processes of performance management, I was concerned to 
investigate how the headteachers viewed the idea of performance management and the impact 
it had on their school and on their teachers. As such, the aim was to gain an emic perspective 
rather than to collect data that was generalisable and so the fieldwork involved ten 
participants, nine headteachers and one director of Human Resources: five were from 
secondary and five were from primary across three different Local Authorities. Four of the 
heads were female, three in primary and one in secondary. Two of the secondary schools 
were academies, the rest were all under their local authority. Purposive sampling was used to 
select schools that were as varied as possible in terms of the rural-urban continuum and 
included schools within areas of high social deprivation as well as schools within areas of 
low levels of deprivation. Once the participants had been recruited, data were collected via 
semi-structured interviews at each of the schools involved. The interviews lasted between 60 
and 100 minutes and were transcribed in full. The analysis of the data began with open 
coding to identify the major themes before a selective coding approach was used to identify 
the areas of most interest. In addition to the interviews, three of the participants also gave me 
a guided tour of key parts of their schools, especially those which had new buildings. One of 
these tours even involved entering classrooms and observing lessons briefly, an example of a 
‘learning walk’, an important feature of the performance management process. On another, 
we walked through one of the new open learning areas where teachers acted as facilitators as 
the pupils worked independently. As such, I had inadvertently become part of the quality 
monitoring processes that were enacted within the schools, one of the surveillers of teachers’ 
work. In all cases the teachers I encountered seemed unperturbed by the arrival of the head 
and a visitor in their classrooms and learning spaces; one commented that we had been the 
second set of observers in 30 minutes, the deputy head having ‘popped in’ earlier in the 
lesson. What was also apparent was that the pupils were well used to senior managers 
entering their classrooms and engaging them in conversation about their learning. Even the 
architecture contributed to the normalization of learning walks: in two cases there were no 
doors to the classrooms and the door ways themselves were wider than usual; elsewhere, the 
new buildings were intentionally open plan to maximize visibility and promulgate new 
pedagogical approaches. These three tours contributed greatly to the themes that are explored 
in this article, and are discussed alongside the interview data in the sections below. 
 
Performance Management Overview 
All of the schools had introduced new performance management processes as a result of the 
government reforms. In the majority of cases, the model proposed by the DfE had been 
adopted with ‘tweaking’. Most of the schools under their local authority had adopted the 
authority-sanctioned model except Martin (a secondary head) who, because of a lack of speed 
in his local authority, had used the proposed model from a neighboring authority where he 
had a contact. All of the heads supported the changes and felt that it increased the potential 
effectiveness of performance management, especially the changes to the capability 
procedures: 
 
James (secondary): The nice thing about the new arrangements is you get things sorted 
quicker and therefore you can put your planning in place and I think 
that’s supportive of the children because that’s what we’re here for. 
 
Few of the participants reported any significant consultation with unions or teachers about the 
changes to performance management. Adopting the model of the DfE and the local authority 
meant that consultation had been deemed to have already taken place. As such, the heads 
issued the model to staff and held various sessions explaining the changes. What was 
significant was that there was little resistance from teachers reported.  
 
Interviewer:  What was the reaction of the teachers to the new system? 
Martin (primary): Laid back to start with thinking ‘oh yeah, another initiative’... They 
were accepting of it, I haven’t heard any mutterings about it – they 
realise it has to be done. 
 
Janet (primary): They were consulted but they didn’t query any of it. It’s on our website 
so when the government gave out their disciplinary and capability 
[policy] it was given to the staff and nobody came back and queried it. 
 
While earlier studies documented the lack of clarity amongst headteachers in regards to the 
purpose and utility of performance management (e.g. Brown, 2005), the participants in this 
study were clear concerning its centrality to the development of individuals and, therefore, 
the school – there was a determination to move from seeing appraisal as a tick-box exercise 
to something more authentic (Gleeson and Husbands, 2003) that could dramatically improve 
standards. The heads were also determined that teachers would find it a positive experience 
rather than viewing performance management as a punitive tool:  
 
Interviewer: So do you think your teachers find performance management 
motivating then? 
Tom (secondary): I would hopefully say yes, that would be my nirvana, that the vast 
majority will find it at the end of the day a positive experience... So if 
you’ve got a culture of targets, expectations and constant feedback, the 
appraisal system is not such a sudden bolt out of the blue.  
 
There was also a concern that teachers were active in their appraisal and self-assessing 
effectively: 
 
Nicola (secondary): Staff are asked to self-identify on the various strands of the teaching 
standards: ‘which bit am I not quite so strong on and then how would I 
go about improving on that?’ 
 
In terms of the actual processes, there was consistency across the ten schools: performance 
management would begin with the appraisal of the headteacher by the governors and advisors 
and the priorities would then cascade down the hierarchy thereby concretising the connection 
between individual and organisational needs and objectives. The appraisal of teachers 
consisted of three objectives in the same areas: pupil attainment, teaching and learning 
(measured against the Teachers’ Standards) and professional development although the exact 
wording of each varied across the sample.  
 
What was most striking in these practices adopted by the headteachers was the range of 
strategies for gathering evidence on teacher performance that informed appraisal. The model 
appraisal and capability model (DfE, 2012a) discusses two means of reviewing performance: 
firstly, there are ‘regular’ formal teaching observations; secondly there are times when senior 
leaders may ‘drop-in’ to classrooms ‘in order to evaluate the standards of teaching and to 
check that high standards of professional performance are established and maintained’ (ibid, 
p6). In neither case is the frequency of visits specified; instead, frequency is to be decided 
according to the ‘overall needs of the school’ and will vary ‘depending on specific 
circumstances’.  What this section does not represent is the extent of observations that 
teachers may be subject to; neither does it represent the additional strategies such as the use 
of pupil feedback or pupil achievement data. What was apparent from this research was that 
the strategies of quality assurance concern making the work of teachers perpetually visible. In 
some cases, this concerns formal observations and ‘learning walks’; in other cases it concerns 
architectural solutions, the creation of open plan classrooms where surveillance is continual 
and un-hidden; in yet others cases organisational structures are designed to render the 
performance of each teacher more visible . What is clear from the data is the state of 
normalised visibility that accompanies approaches to performance management, approaches 
that move beyond evaluating competence towards a state of perpetual Ofsted-readiness. The 
next section will consider each of these strategies in turn beginning with observations and 
learning walks.  
 
Visibility: observations and learning walks 
The lifting of the three hour limit on teaching observations was the most contested section of 
the reforms and was a point of insistence by the NASUWT and NUT unions. The majority of 
the headteachers in this research retained the three hour limit: 
 Sue (primary): We don’t come near that to be honest and it’s not a very union-minded 
school fortunately for me. I know all the action short of a strike came 
through and I was aware of that but it didn’t affect us in school. And 
the three hours a year – all our observations are 30 minutes so staff 
aren’t observed anywhere near three hours a year anyway.  
 
However, the participants from the two academies welcomed this section of the reforms: 
 
Interviewer:  And it’s removed the three hours limit on teaching observations 
Keith (secondary): Well we ignored that anyway [laughs]. 
Interviewer:  How many would you do on average? 
Keith: Well in the past probably three or four; now it could be up to six 
dependent on the outcomes of the observations.   
 
Peter (secondary): We say we can drop in when we want to observe which is going to be 
one of the key issues in the policy. 
 
However, while the majority of the participants retained the three hour limit or less, it is 
important to note that these were formalized, pre-arranged observations. Often teachers were 
allowed to identify the lesson that they wished to be observed in to lessen the anxiety that 
observations inevitably conjured but also to give the best representation of their practice 
possible; as such, they were relatively un-panoptic.  
 
While formal observations were considered valuable, there was a recognition by the heads 
that, due to the fact they were pre-arranged, their actual usefulness as an indicator of ‘real’ 
quality was limited. As such, learning walks (called ‘drop-ins’ in the DfE’s model) were 
often considered a far more valuable means of evaluating teacher performance. However, 
learning walks were highly variable in nature: in some cases they were formalised and 
consisted of senior leaders walking around corridors stopping in every classroom; at other 
times random classrooms would be entered; sometimes they would focus on a specific theme 
such as feedback, others would be generalised; sometimes observers would observe without 
interaction, other times they would speak to pupils, check books and question the teachers. 
The indefiniteness of learning walks was even more pronounced in primary schools – as 
smaller organisations with greater levels of pupil-headteacher interaction, the primary heads 
reported that they were in classrooms a great deal anyway; as such, the status of these 
everyday visits was unclear. What was also unclear was the extent to which learning walks 
were an official means of evaluating teachers. At one end of the continuum were those heads 
who were very clear that learning walks would officially inform their judgement: 
 
Martin (primary): I’m in and out of the class anyway for 10 minutes at a time doing other 
things. I say to staff, ‘you realise when I come in your room, I’m 
looking. Even if I’m talking to you or passing on a message I will be 
making a judgement as to what’s going on in your room’.  
 
At the other end of the continuum were those heads who stated a separation between 
performance management and learning walks: 
 
James (secondary): I was very clear about the purpose of learning walks – I don’t use 
learning walks to instigate capability so as a result of a learning walk I 
wouldn’t say ‘right, informal meeting, capability, whatever’, that’s not 
fair at all.  
 
Thus, while observations were considered a valuable means of informing appraisals, there 
was a general consensus that learning works provided a much more accurate measure of 
teacher competence – panoptically, they could happen at any time in any classroom. On the 
one hand, heads argued that learning walks therefore reduced levels of anxiety, a similar 
argument used by Ofsted to justify almost zero-notice inspections (Wilshaw, 2012). Instead, 
as argued by Perryman (2009) and Page (2013), almost zero-notice inspections may 
normalise anxiety by requiring teachers to be in a constant state of Ofsted-readiness. In 
addition, in this context, learning walks also helped to normalise visibility.  
 
Visibility: open learning spaces 
Delineating learning walks from other classroom visits was much more difficult in primary 
schools than secondary. As smaller organisations with fewer staff and less interactional 
distance between senior leaders and pupils, primary headteachers visited classrooms more 
often than their secondary counterparts: 
 
Sue (primary): We’re very much ‘doors are expected to be open’, [teachers] know 
people are in and out all of the time… People just expect that. 
 
Janet (primary): When you walk down the corridor you can see what’s going on in the 
doors as you walk down. If there’s a problem then I’d be in. 
 In these primary schools, open doors to classrooms were a given and so teachers were used to 
senior leaders and others entering their classes. Again, in these contexts, normalised visibility 
was an integral part of the culture. It should also be stressed that teaching was not just 
observed by senior leaders: teaching assistants, peers and teacher-trainees were all regular 
features of the primary teachers’ classroom which helped the normalisation process.  
 
Yet the visibility culture of the primary sector was also found to be influencing secondary 
schools. Three of the secondary schools had recently completed new building works and 
visibility had been very much a part of the architecture in several examples: two of the 
schools had built classrooms without doors and with extra wide doorways so that anyone 
walking along the corridor could see what was happening. One of these schools had also built 
a suite of classrooms with glass walls so that, again, even the casual observer could see what 
was happening. Elsewhere the architectural visibility was even more pronounced. Nicola’s 
school had recently had a completely new building added and, as well as building classrooms 
without doors, there was a large open plan learning space: 
 
Nicola (secondary): All of that big space is open so classes are taught alongside each other 
and it’s a very visible, mutually supportive environment because what 
goes wrong is seen by everybody and supported by everybody… and 
the extended leadership team are a visible presence in those areas – 
whenever they’re not teaching they’re there, they’ve got office spaces 
with visibility out and a lot of staff will work out in the open areas as 
well if they’ve got free periods so they’ve got an overview as well. 
 
Peter’s school, part of a secondary academy chain, was also a new build. After our interview 
he gave me a tour of the key elements. At the heart of the main building was a wide open area 
filled with desks, each sporting computers and books around the outside. The open learning 
space was literally on the main pathway through the building and so was observable to 
everyone who passed, teachers, pupils and visitors. Not only this but the upper floors of the 
building also looked down upon the area as did the glass elevator and glass-walled staircase. 
Finally, several members of the senior leadership team had offices adjacent to the areas. 
Here, teachers would set project-based work for pupils who would then work independently 
while teachers facilitated the activity. There were two justifications for these open space 
designs: firstly they were an attempt to architecturally force different teaching strategies upon 
staff, especially approaches that prioritised independent learning, pedagogy that headteachers 
considered to be favoured by Ofsted.. The second justification was that, in Nicola’s words, 
‘bad things happen in closed classrooms’ and that, if there was serious pupil  misbehaviour, 
as the areas were continually visible, assistance could be to hand in a matter of seconds.  
 
Visibility: organisation structure 
Another structural method of creating teacher visibility was organisational rather than 
architectural and this was apparent in two of the sample schools. Here, the aim was to create 
schools-within-schools (Raywid, 1996; Lee and Ready, 2007), an approach popularized in the 
US that creates semi-autonomous sub-units within the main school structure. For example, 
when Anthony was charged with the redesign of his secondary school, he and the other senior 
leaders visited America to learn more about the model, returned and created a school with 
three separate schools-within-a-school, each with its own principal and each replicating the 
main curriculum areas together with a specialism. For example, each school would have its 
own English and maths department but more resource intensive subjects such as science 
would become a specialism for one of the mini-schools. One impact of this approach is that 
the visibility of each teacher was heightened as Anthony explained: 
 
When you break an organisation down into small chunks, both pupils and staff lose 
the anonymity of large numbers… If you have a large department you can get people 
hiding and there’s collusion to hide. Sounds quite cynical but that does happen. With 
the small school approach that can’t happen because in each one of these schools 
there are only three teachers [per subject]. Now if one of them is under-performing 
it’s going to have a massive impact on outcomes. That can’t be allowed... It’s a bit 
like primary schools but with a secondary school curriculum 
 
In this model, underperformance could be identified more easily because each teacher is 
much more visible than in large schools. Not only that but the visibility of the college 
principals is also increased  – if they don’t act quickly to tackle underperformance, their own 
performance as managers would be questioned. As such, rather than being physically visible, 
teachers are structurally visible; and with structural visibility comes data-visibility. Each of 
the heads collected vast amounts of data on their schools which allowed perpetual 
monitoring: 
 
Tom (secondary): It’s all electronic on databases and there are various people 
interrogating it. The support teams are interrogating the data, they meet 
every night to review the day, pick up any issues that have arisen, the 
senior leadership meet every morning and again they’re picking up any 
issues that have arisen the day before, both with students and the staff. 
That’s the immediate if you like then of course we’ve got the weekly 
reports and the termly reports so we know what’s going on. 
 
In schools-within-schools and in small departments, if the data on pupil attainment does not 
meet the institutional targets, the teacher responsible can be far more easily identified. Here 
the comparison with primary schools alluded to by Anthony is even more significant: 
teachers in small organisations have a massive impact both positively and negatively and so 
by normalizing visibility structurally, underperformance can be identified much more readily, 
even in the absence of physical visibility.  
 
Student voice 
The final means of collecting data on teacher performance was not detailed in the reforms 
and involved gathering feedback from pupils; and if learning walks were semi-official 
methods of making teachers’ practice more visible, pupil feedback (or ‘student voice’) was 
even more liminal in the official-unofficial dichotomy. Again there was a range of practices 
for collecting pupil feedback: Janet favoured a naturalistic approach and would chat to pupils 
in the process of learning walks: 
 
Janet (primary): I do walk round the school quite a lot, mainly because I like to be 
involved with the children so I’ll sit and talk to the children and you do 
pick up – the children here are very vocal [laughs] and we do 
encourage that. 
 
At the other end of the continuum, headteachers would arrange meetings with pupils to 
discuss their progress and any concerns they might have. James, a secondary head, held 
lunches for class representatives but found that they were too nervous to eat. After a while, 
however, the notion of meeting the headteacher became less intimidating and he found the 
sessions valuable. Keith, another secondary head, took the process even further and 
personally interviewed all students in years 9, 10 and 11, around 220 pupils. The main 
priority of the meetings was to discuss their progress and to motivate them; however, he did 
concede that feedback on individual teachers was inevitable. 
 
Keith (secondary): That’s the other feedback, I interview all students in 9, 10 and 11 and 
they tell me what’s going on. I don’t ask [about teachers] but they will 
tell me – I say I don’t ask, I would go through the subjects and say ‘ok, 
English: your target is C, currently you’re on a D, are we going to do 
it?’ Sometimes they say ‘no’ and I say ‘why is that’ and they say ‘I 
need some help’. Sometimes they say ‘I’m going to do it’ or ‘I’m 
going to get a B’ then I say ‘who’s your teacher’ and that’s when they 
will tell me things and most of the time they will praise the staff.  
 
While student voice was an integral part of the quality procedures within each of the schools 
– and even extended to pupils sitting on interview panels – its status as part of performance 
management was vague. While most of the headteachers claimed that it did not inform their 
judgement in terms of teacher evaluations, it would be difficult for anyone not to be 
influenced by pupil reports of poor teaching. Thus, while pupil feedback would unlikely be 
officially included within appraisals, it acted as another means of rendering teachers visible, 
with pupils acting as proxy observers in the absence of official observations.  
 
 
Invisibility 
As argued in the previous sections, the collection of evidence to inform the judgement of 
performance is based upon teachers becoming highly visible. However, in stark contrast, the 
actual process of judgement is largely invisible. Appraisals are confidential matters, 
discussions and negotiations between the appraiser and appraisee where the conclusions from 
the data collection exercises are revealed together with the self-reflection (or the self-
informing) by the teachers themselves. For those practitioners who meet their objectives, 
those whose teaching meets the ‘good or better’ standard appropriated by headteachers from 
Ofsted, the appraisal should ideally be a motivating experience and even be linked to 
progression through the pay spines. For those who do not meet their objectives, for those 
whose performance is poor, the process becomes even less visible. While the reforms aimed 
to dismiss incompetent teachers within a term, the heads in this study felt that was an 
underestimation of the time dismissal takes, time that could be better spent on improving 
their schools. As such, the management of poorly performing teachers involved strategies 
outside of the government’s capability process. 
 
Keith (secondary): 10 staff left last year at our invitation... Mostly what we do is come to 
an agreement that ‘this is not the right school for you’ so they resign or 
we pay them off. We don’t follow the [Local Authority] procedures 
because you’d still have an incompetent teacher two years after you 
start the process and we can’t afford to do that. So we have a budget of 
about £30,000 a year to pay staff off basically. 
 
Peter (secondary): One of the things I’ve noticed in education is the amount of 
compromise agreements that are drawn up, it’s huge… You can 
understand them saying ‘I want to get rid of this poorly performing 
teacher, I don’t want to do it in 26 weeks I want to do it quickly’, 
compromise agreement, we get rid of them. 
 
While many of the participants had managed poorly performing teachers, few had ever had to 
see the process through to the end and the dismissal of the teacher. Much more common were 
the invisible conversations that took place between headteacher and teacher. The participants 
framed these conversations in the following way: the teacher was sat down, the reasons for 
concern were outlined by the head and the capability process explained together with the 
likely result of being sacked. Often accompanying this conversation was a common narrative: 
‘this is not the right school for you; you may do much better in a different school’. The 
majority of teachers well understood the implicit threat contained within the conversation 
and, usually with their union representative, negotiated a ‘compromise agreement’ that 
exchanged cash and a reference (however generic) for a resignation. The heads were 
therefore saved from lengthy and time consuming capability procedures and the teacher saved 
themselves from having ‘dismissal’ on their record. Compromise agreements were reported 
to be a common feature of the performance management landscape in schools, with Tom 
reporting a conversation with a union representative who claimed to have 25 agreements on 
his desk from just one Local Authority. However, while the collection of performance 
evidence of teachers was highly visible, the process of negotiating exit was invisible, a 
clandestine process that hid the existence of incompetence. What else the strategy hid was 
debatable. All of the participants, perhaps unsurprisingly, claimed that a negotiated 
resignation was the result of a suggestion rather than a threat – how it was experienced by the 
teachers concerned may well be a different matter.  
 
What was also significant was how the use of compromise agreements by-passed a 
significant feature of the reforms to the capability process. In the past it was suggested that 
dismissed teachers who resigned once capability procedures had begun were given 
satisfactory references as an attempt induce voluntary exit. As such, poorly performing 
teachers were able to move from school to school without improving their teaching. The 
reforms therefore attempt to end this ‘recycling’ process by obliging headteachers to include 
details of capability procedures in a reference even if staff resigned before dismissal (DfE, 
2012c). With a poor reference, teachers were unlikely to resign voluntarily once capability 
had begun and so the hidden conversation that took place at the beginning was vital – if the 
teacher resigned before capability began, they could have a reference that made no mention 
of what was impending. Headteachers were therefore acting within the scope of the reforms 
and poorly performing teachers left with cash and a reference free from mention of 
capability. For some of the headteachers, compromise agreements were a matter of 
pragmatics – they saved everyone’s time and they saved their pupils from the impact of poor 
performance. Others, however, were more conflicted – while the pupils in their own school 
were delivered from incompetence, compromise agreements would inflict poor performance 
upon other pupils in other schools: 
 
Nicola (secondary): We then got a point where that person shall we say ‘agreed to resign’ 
so that went through in that way and the compromise agreement there 
was – which I don’t like but I had to go along with... The term is well 
used because I think it compromises me [original emphasis]. 
 
The management of incompetence was therefore a matter of invisibility, hiding the 
conversations that outlined the consequences of resistance and hiding mention of capability in 
subsequent references. But while the performance of teachers was hidden within the 
management of incompetence, so too, presumably, was the performance of headteachers who 
could report to the governing body and Ofsted that a member of staff had left but not report 
the exact circumstances of the departure or the conversation that may have induced it.  
 
Discussion 
There is irony at the heart of the performance management of teachers: with the abolition of 
the General Teaching Council for England, the regulation of teacher competence became 
invisible to the public signalling a greater shift for teachers’ professionalism from an 
occupational to an organisational form (Evetts, 2009). At an institutional level, however, 
teachers work within a context of normalised visibility where they are perpetually surveilled, 
judged and evaluated through a variety of means: observations, learning walks, open learning 
spaces, organisational structures, electronic data and student voice. In much of the extant 
literature such surveillance has been framed by the panoptic metaphor, of discipline being 
internalised via the fear that the docile bodies may be observed at any time. But panopticism 
relies on the potential for being observed – inmates in Bentham’s penal architecture could not 
tell whether they were being observed as the guard tower was designed so that they could not 
tell whether the guards were watching or not. It was therefore, according to Foucault, this 
possibility of observation that created self-discipline. Panopticism, after all, functions through 
‘its discretion, its low exteriorization, its relative invisibility’ (Foucault, 1991, p218). It is 
here, then, that the limits of panopticism in relation to the surveillance of teachers is limited, 
for the means of rendering teachers constantly visible is not always discrete, it is often highly 
exteriorized and itself very visible. Panopticism relies on anonymity, covertness and the 
uncertain presence of an observer; in schools, teachers are often well aware that they are 
being surveilled constantly and they also know who by.  While panopticism may still 
function in terms of ‘traditional’ means of surveillance such as classroom observations and 
learning walks by senior leaders, other means of surveillance are less panoptic: data on 
performance does not reside solely in the headteachers’ computer – it is public and shared 
and overtly informs judgements of competence; organisational structures of small teams 
facilitates constant performance-visibility; in open learning spaces teachers know they are 
being watched continually by their colleagues, by senior leaders in their adjacent offices and 
by visitors and pupils who walk by. Teachers, therefore, do not work exclusively within a 
panoptic environment; instead, a different metaphor may be more appropriate for this form of 
normalised visibility.  
 
Gabriel (2005 and 2008) argues that the contemporary organisation has become a place of 
glass: 
 
The metaphor of the glass cage suggests certain constraints, discontents, and 
consolations quite distinct from those we encounter at the high noon of modernity. 
Shared features of the glass cage of work and the glass cage of consumption are an 
emphasis on image, an invisibility of constraints, a powerful illusion of choice, and an 
ironic question mark as to whether freedom lies inside or outside the glass. Above all, 
there is an ambiguity as to whether the glass is a medium of entrapment or a 
beautifying frame (Gabriel, 2008, p311) 
 
On one level, the glass metaphor preserves the fundamental concept of the panopticon with 
its foregrounding of surveillance; however, with glass, surveillance is overt – the observer 
can also be seen. Furthermore, by understanding the modern school in terms of glass, we 
foreground the notion of spectacle, of display, of exposure to the ‘critical gaze of the 
customer’ (Gabriel, 2005, p19) – it is a metaphor that raises transparency to a ‘supreme 
value’. From this perspective, rather that viewing teachers within the ‘iron cage’ of Weber 
(1958 and 1978), a glass cage may be more appropriate: visible at all times via a variety of 
means, scrutinised and evaluated via triangulated measures, held up as beatific exemplars of 
‘good and outstanding’ to Ofsted and prospective parents. This glass cage is also proferred as 
a measure of fairness: ‘yes, surveillance may be constant and overt but at least it applies to 
everyone’ is the argument offered. Transparency, therefore, becomes the banner of 
organisational justice. 
 
But this is not to suggest that the glass metaphor only acts to identify incompetence within 
classrooms. Glass also acts as a ‘framing medium attesting that what is behind it is worthy of 
attention and admiration’ (Gabriel, 2008, p312). In this research I was taken on a learning 
walk, entering classrooms where pupils were busily engaged in learning, where teachers 
employed ICT expertly, where the learning objectives were displayed proudly to facilitate the 
metacognition of the children; on tours I was shown the bespoke open plan learning spaces 
full of newly purchased PCs and facilitating members of staff. Here, although I was merely a 
visitor, the ‘glass cage’ framed what was ‘good and outstanding’, the Ofsted-inspired aim of 
all heads and all teachers – if there were classrooms full of disruptive pupils and poor 
teachers, I was not shown them. Yet the tours I was taken on also highlighted the multiple 
statuses of headteachers. In one role they are curators of the spectacles on the other side of 
the glass, framing the performance of their staff for visitors; in another role they are 
evaluators of the caged, the metaphorical physicians of Foucault (1986) enforcing the 
regimen of performativity by constantly observing via a variety of measures; finally, they 
themselves may be considered part of the spectacle: framed by the glass, watched and 
surveilled themselves by parents, Ofsted and the Department for Education.  
 Yet while evidence of performance is gathered within a context of normalised visibility, 
actual judgement is conducted within an organisational blindspot. Appraisals are dyadic, 
behind closed doors, with shades of the confessional (Barry et al., 2001; Wilson 2002) where 
teachers engage in critical self-reflection before being confronted with the portfolio of 
evidence collected from electronic data, learning walks, formal observations, organisational 
structures and student voice. Here, with satisfactory no longer satisfactory in Ofsted terms, 
only good or outstanding is good enough; for those who fail to meet the required standing, 
capability measures are employed to remove the poorly performing teacher within a term 
according to the reforms. However, the data from this research suggested that in many cases, 
rather than pursue time-consuming processes, teachers were offered deals, ‘compromise 
agreements’ with ‘incompetent’ teachers offered money and a reference if they resigned. 
Keith’s school had a budget for these deals; Peter told of a conversation with a union 
representative who had 25 compromise agreements on her desk for just one local authority; of 
the 12 teachers James put into the capability process when he joined the school, all made 
deals or resigned before the end of the process. Here, then, in stark contrast to the glass cages 
within which the evaluation of performance management takes place, capability proceedings 
involve the hidden, clandestine deals that circumvent the official procedures; the management 
of incompetence involves normalised invisibility. Headteachers, therefore, while highly 
visible within the glass cage themselves in terms of external surveillance, Ofsted inspections, 
league tables, benchmarking and parental survey responses (see Page, 2013), manage to find 
a space within which to be hidden, to conduct invisible negotiations to eliminate 
incompetence from their schools. Visibility is therefore explicitly a matter of organisational 
power, controlled by senior school leaders in response to their own visibility. Here is the limit 
of transparency and, in turn, the limit of visibility as a measure of organisational justice. 
While schools may therefore be understood metaphorically as glass organisations, in places 
the glass is opaque.  
 
Conclusion 
Since the Conservative/Liberal coalition government came to power, schools have been 
inundated with new policies and new powers. In a context where ‘satisfactory’ has become 
‘requires improvement’ and international league tables of performance continue to define 
policy, the performance of individual teachers has become the prime focus. The reforms to 
the performance management and capability procedures introduced in 2013 gave increased 
powers to headteachers to improve their schools, subjecting teachers to potentially unlimited 
observations and far shorter dismissal processes. Yet the headteachers in this study reported a 
generally measured approach to performance management that retained the observation limit 
in most cases. However, it was also clear that this concession to the teaching unions was 
supplemented by a wide variety of strategies to create an environment of normalised visibility 
where teachers were continually observed. Yet surveillance was found not to be always 
panoptic for often it was neither covert nor anonymised; rather surveillance was open and 
apparent, and distributed between heads, senior leaders, other teachers, pupils and even 
visitors. From a critical perspective, it can be argued that teachers work within a ‘glass cage’ 
that foregrounds transparency and spectacle, rendering the incompetent and the beatific both 
visible. Yet while transparency may be offered as a measure of fairness and organisational 
justice, other elements of the performance management process are hidden and invisible, 
especially in the management of poorly performing teachers. Here, headteachers’ practice is 
obscured from view, enacted through clandestine conversations and negotiations which offer 
compromise agreements as a means of bypassing highly visible and lengthy capability and 
dismissal processes. Therefore the visibility of performance in schools is selective and 
controlled by headteachers. However, it must also be stressed that headteachers themselves 
are subject to surveillance with the gaze of the Department for Education and Ofsted to be 
perpetually managed; and this gaze is perhaps the ultimate cause of invisibility as well as 
visibility of performance.  
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